Community Insurance Versus Compulsory Insurance: Competing Paradigms of No-Fault Accident Compensation in New Zealand by Connell, Simon
1  
 
Community Insurance Versus Compulsory Insurance: Competing Paradigms of No-




This article presents a history of New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme 
as a struggle between two competing normative paradigms that justify the core 
reform of the replacement of civil actions for victims of personal injury with a 
comprehensive no-fault scheme. Under ‘community insurance’, the scheme 
represents the community taking moral and practical responsibility for members 
who are injured in accidents, while for ‘compulsory insurance’ the scheme is a 
specific form of compulsory accident insurance. Understanding the history of 
the scheme in this way helps explain both the persistence of the scheme and 
important changes made to it by different governments. 
  
1. Introduction 
New Zealand’s comprehensive no-fault accident compensation scheme commenced on 1 
April 1974.1 The scheme is comprehensive in the sense that it provides cover for anyone 
suffering personal injury by accident regardless of the cause in contrast with, for example, 
a workers’ or motor vehicle injury compensation scheme. The scheme is no-fault in the 
sense that the injured person seeking compensation does not need to establish that their 
injury was the result of a departure from some required standard2 and fault on the part of 
the accident victim is irrelevant.3 
  
1 Accident Compensation Act 1972 (“the 1972 Act”, and so on) and its successors: the Accident 
Compensation Act 1982, Accident Rehabilitation Compensation and Insurance Act 1992, Accident Insurance 
Act 1998 and Injury Prevention, Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2001 (later renamed the Accident 
Compensation Act 2001). For the sake of variety, the scheme implemented by these statutes is referred to 
herein as “ACC”, “the ACC scheme” and “the scheme”. 
2 The system is not dispute free, see Acclaim Otago, Understanding the Problem: An analysis of ACC appeals 
processes to identify barriers to justice for injured New Zealanders (Report supported by the New Zealand 
Law Foundation and University of Otago Legal Issues Centre, 2015) [207] and, by the same authors, see also 
‘The Idea of Access to Justice: Reflections on New Zealand’s Accident Compensation (or Personal Injury) 
System’ (2016) 33 Windsor YB Access Just 197, 202. 




Now, over four decades later, the core reform of the scheme remains in place: victims 
of personal injury by accident receive “entitlements” under the scheme and cannot recover 
compensation from wrongdoers through the civil law.4 New Zealand still has a law of torts, 
but torts cases are rarely concerned with personal injuries.5 
Since the introduction of the scheme, New Zealand has seen eight different 
governments, which have implemented fundamental reforms of the basic features of the 
economy and the social welfare system. Although there have been changes to the details in 
the administration and funding of the scheme, and the scope for cover and the requirements 
for compensation, the core reform of the ACC scheme has endured: victims of personal 
injury by accident still receive compensation under the scheme and still cannot sue. 
A common explanation for the presence of comprehensive no-fault accident 
compensation in New Zealand, which Jesse Wall described as the “abandonment view”, 
goes something like this: the people of New Zealand abandoned the tort system in favour 
of ACC because they preferred a system that provides compensation to all victims of injury 
over a system that makes wrongdoers who cause injury make up for the harm that they 
inflict.6 Sir Geoffrey Palmer, a prominent proponent of this view, has put it in strong terms: 
  
4 A person with an injury covered under the statute receives “entitlements” as long as they meet the statutory 
criteria. Entitlements include compensation for lost earnings, lump sum compensation for permanent 
impairment, treatment, and social and vocational rehabilitation. The bar on proceedings is found in s 317 of 
the 2001 Act. 
5 Exceptions include proceedings for exemplary damages (see Couch v Attorney-General (No 2) [2010] 
NZSC 27, [2010] 3 NZLR 149) and cases of psychiatric illness that do not receive cover under the scheme 
(see Queenstown Lakes District Council v Palmer [1999] 1 NZLR 549 (CA) and van Soest v Residual Health 
Management Unit [2000] 1 NZLR 179 (CA)). 
6 Jesse Wall, ‘No-Fault Compensation and Unlocking Tort Law’s “Reciprocal Normative Embrace”’ (2016) 
27 NZULR 125, 126. 
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the people of New Zealand place no value on making wrongdoers pay and instead care 
about the welfare of others.7 
New Zealand still has a comprehensive no-fault scheme, a supporter of the 
abandonment view might suggest, because that is still the case. There is certainly some 
truth to the abandonment view. There is no popular support for the resurrection of 
negligence actions for personal injury.8 New Zealanders abroad tend to be as puzzled at 
seeing advertisements for personal injury lawyers as visitors to New Zealand are puzzled 
by their absence.9 The abandonment view also has the appeal of being a sufficient 
explanation for the ongoing presence of ACC. It could also perhaps explain the absence of 
comprehensive no-fault schemes in similar jurisdictions such as the United States of 
America or the United Kingdom: those societies must not have embraced comprehensive 
no-fault because New Zealand was (and still is) a highly community-minded socialist 
society. However, the level of collectivism in New Zealand society has waxed and waned 
over time. Palmer reflected in 1996 that:10 
  
7 For the first proposition see Geoffrey Palmer, ‘New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme: Twenty 
Years On’ (1994) 44 UTLJ 223, 247–253. For the latter see Geoffrey Palmer, Compensation for Incapacity 
(Oxford University Press 1979) 64. See ‘The Idea of Access to Justice’  (n 2) 201. 
8 A return to the right to sue was raised in a report commissioned by the New Zealand Business Roundtable 
Report, see Cushla Thomson, Susan Begg and Bryce Wilkinson, Accident Compensation: Options for Reform 
(New Zealand Business Roundtable 1998) 85-156 and has been suggested by some academics, see, Richard 
Mahoney, ‘New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme: A Reassessment’ (1992) 40 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 159 and Richard Miller, ‘The Future of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation 
Scheme’ (1989) 11 U Hawaii LR 1. Compare Peter Cane and Patrick Atiyah, Atiyah’s Accidents, 
Compensation and the Law (7th edn, Cambridge University Press 2006) 471-472 and the New Zealand Law 
Commission’s response to Miller in (1990) 12 U Hawaii LR 339, 342.  
9 See David Hackett Fischer, Fairness and Freedom: A History of Two Open Societies New Zealand and the 
United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 472 and W Bradley Wendel, ‘Political Culture and 
the Rule of Law: Comparing the United States and New Zealand’ [2012] Otago LR 663, 691-692. 
10 Geoffrey Palmer, ‘Commentary’ in Richard Epstein (ed), Accident Compensation: The Faulty Basis of No-
fault and State Provision (New Zealand Business Roundtable 1996) 22, and ‘The Future of Community 
Responsibility’ (2004) 35(4) VURLW 905, 912, and Alan Clayton, ‘Some Reflections on the Woodhouse 
and ACC Legacy’ (2003) 34 VUWLR 449, 457. 
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[T]he political culture of New Zealand may be changing, in the past we have 
accepted a high level of collectivist solutions to the misfortunes of individuals, 
and have regarded them as a state responsibility…   
Thus, we have reason to doubt that the abandonment view can explain why the ACC 
scheme is still here, even if it could explain the genesis of the scheme. It is worth noting 
that the abandonment view is not universally accepted as a valid explanation for the 
introduction of ACC. Wall rejected it because the abandonment view as it is usually 
articulated entails the position that the fault principle underlying tort law is philosophically 
unsound. This puts him at odds with those such as Palmer, who saw no merit at all in a 
corrective justice justification for tort actions, making the shift to a no-fault scheme an 
obvious improvement. Wall’s view is that the implementation of ACC, seen as a 
philosophical shift to viewing personal injuries as “wrongful” in the sense that the 
community is obliged to provide a remedy, prevents the crystallization of a corrective-
justice based obligation that any individual provide a remedy for the injury in question.11 
Thus, corrective justice is not so much abandoned in favour of something better but never 
comes into play in the first place given the ACC scheme. Wall argues that something of 
value is lost (and cannot be regained) in the transition to ACC: the application of the fault 
principle as a coherent whole and thus the “normative connection between actions and 
outcomes”.12 While Wall was concerned with providing an explanation for the introduction 
of ACC that does not involve dismissing the value of making citizens responsible for harm-
causing departures from an objective standard of behaviour, I am concerned with finding 
  
11 Wall (n 6) 125-126 
12 ibid 142-144. 
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an explanation for why the ACC scheme is still here that fits with New Zealand’s political 
history.  
The main argument put forward in this paper is that the core reform of ACC (i.e. the 
removal of civil actions for victims of injury and the introduction of a comprehensive no-
fault scheme) has persisted because it is compatible with the political philosophies of the 
left and right wings of politics in New Zealand. This explains why the core reform remains 
intact despite successive left- and right- wing governments in New Zealand that have 
implemented other significant policy changes. The scheme has survived not because there 
is a political consensus about the philosophy of the scheme but because the core reform is 
compatible with different political philosophies. Supporting the core reform does not 
necessarily entail a general preference for collectivist solutions, or a particular degree of 
concern for the welfare of others. Appreciating that New Zealand still has ACC in spite of 
a lack of general political consensus about collectivism, not because of it, helps understand 
the ongoing presence of the scheme and also some of the changes made to the detail of the 
scheme by different governments. 
I develop this argument by articulating two competing normative paradigms of 
comprehensive no-fault accident compensation: “community insurance” and “compulsory 
insurance”. By itself, the idea that the scheme has persisted because it appeals to different 
political perspectives may seem trite.13 Articulating these two competing paradigms in 
detail advances things further and performs two useful functions. First, it gives a developed 
account of how the core reform, typically associated with collectivism, is also compatible 
  
13 See, for example, Felicity Lamm, Nadine McDonnell and Susan St John, ‘The Rhetoric versus the Reality: 




with a competitive/individualist worldview. Second, it explains specific changes in the 
history of the scheme.   
The next part of this introductory section considers the origin of ACC. Then, I 
provide more detail on the political “left” and “right” in New Zealand. Part 2 of the article 
sets out “community insurance” and “compulsory insurance” in the abstract. Part 3 then 
demonstrates how the conflict between community insurance and compulsory insurance is 
evident in several political and legislative developments. Finally, I offer some comments 
for other jurisdictions considering the introduction of a similar scheme. 
A A Royal Commission for the problem of injury 
ACC was introduced following the recommendations of a Royal Commission of Inquiry 
established to consider the law relating to compensation for injured workers. The resulting 
Report,14 generally referred to as the “Woodhouse Report” after its chairman Sir Owen 
Woodhouse, went further and proposed a revolutionary reform providing no-fault 
compensation for all victims of injury.15 We can turn to the text of the Woodhouse Report 
to provide both a helpful summary of, and critique of, the availability of compensation for 
injured persons in New Zealand in the late 1960s:16 
The toll of personal injury is one of the disastrous incidents of social progress, 
and the statistically inevitable victims are entitled to receive a co-ordinated 
  
14 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand 
Compensation for personal injury in New Zealand; Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Wellington: 
1967), hereafter “Woodhouse Report”. 
15 See Peter McKenzie, ‘The Compensation Scheme No One Asked For: The Origins of ACC in New 
Zealand’ (2003) 34 VUWLR 193. 
16 Woodhouse Report, 1. The Report omitted the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, which provided 
compensation to injured victims of crime in some circumstances, see McKenzie (n 15) 195 and Simon 
Connell, ‘Justice for Victims of Injury: The Influence of New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme on 
the Civil and Criminal Law’ (2012) 25 NZULR 181, 186. 
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response from the nation as a whole. They receive this only from the health 
service. For financial relief they must turn to three entirely different remedies, 
and frequently they are aided by none.  
The negligence action is a form of lottery. In the case of industrial accidents it 
provides inconsistent solutions for less than one victim in every hundred. The 
Workers' Compensation Act provides meagre compensation for workers, but 
only if their injury occurred at their work. The Social Security Act will assist 
with the pressing needs of those who remain, provided they can meet the means 
test. All others are left to fend for themselves.  
As well as criticising the overall distribution of the burden of accidents, the 
Woodhouse Report argued that the fault principle at the heart of the negligence action was 
itself philosophically faulty. This philosophical criticism included that the idea of making 
transgressors of an objective standard of behaviour make reparation to people injured by 
that wrongful act was illogical because (i) failure to meet an objective standard cannot be 
equated with moral blameworthiness and (ii) the fault principle can result in the defendant 
having to pay damages which are disproportionate to the wrongfulness of the conduct 
which is said to justify them.17  
The Report proposed both a set of principles to guide, and a detailed proposal for, an 
alternative scheme. The Woodhouse Report put forward five principles to underpin the new 
proposed scheme. These principles contain normative statements about how society ought 
to behave as well as providing a kind of blueprint for the shape of the scheme. 
  
17 Woodhouse Report, 49 and 50. See Wall (n 6) 130-133 for a sound critique of these arguments. 
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i. Community responsibility 
The whole community should take responsibility for the burden of accidents. This is the 
moral imperative underpinning the Royal Commission’s proposed scheme. The 
Woodhouse Report puts forward two arguments for why the community, as a whole, should 
take responsibility of all the injuries suffered through myriad causes. The arguments are at 
the same time an appeal to self–interest and a statement of moral responsibility.18 The first 
is that “as a modern society benefits from the productive work of its citizens, so should 
society accept responsibility for those willing to work but prevented from doing so by 
physical incapacity.”19 The second is that the phenomenon of personal injury by accident 
can be understood as the statistically inevitable result of activities that the community 
collectively takes part in and benefits from. Accordingly, the community should take 
responsibility for the “random but statistically necessary victims”.20 As to how the 
community should fund the cost of sustaining victims of injury, the Report’s articulation 
of the community responsibility principle simply states that the “inherent cost of these 
community purposes should be borne on a basis of equity by the community.”21  
ii. Comprehensive entitlement 
Victims of injury ought to be treated equally regardless of the cause of injury:22 
  
18 This is made clear in the summary of the principle of community responsibility in the summary chapter of 
the report: “the nation has not merely a clear duty but also a vested interest in urging forward the physical 
and economic rehabilitation of every adult citizen whose activities bear upon the general welfare.” 
Woodhouse Report, 20. 
19 ibid 40. 
20 ibid 40. 
21 ibid 40. 
22 ibid 40. The Report makes the exception that “the elderly and the young … cannot reasonably expect to be 
provided with a form of social insurance on the same level.” This means, for example, that non-earners cannot 
necessarily expect to receive compensation for lost earnings in the same way that earners would.  
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there can be no justification for providing from community funds for the same 
class of worker entirely inconsistent awards for precisely similar incapacities 
merely because fortuitously the causes which gave rise to them have at different 
stages of our social development been the subject of conflicting responses. 
iii. Complete rehabilitation 
Although injury losses must be quantified in money terms, the primary focus of the scheme 
should be rehabilitation.23 This principle distinguishes the proposed scheme from a system 
focused on compensation. 
iv. Real compensation: 
Compensation ought to be generous and based on real losses, in contrast with the means-
tested benefits based on meeting basic needs provided by the Social Welfare system. This 
principle distinguishes the proposed social insurance scheme from social welfare. The 
report argues that the latter system made sense as a response by a financially-stretched 
society to the poverty caused by the Great Depression of the 1930s, but that a different 
approach could and ought to be taken to injury by the more affluent society that New 
Zealand had grown into by the 1960s. 
v. Administrative efficiency 
Although the Woodhouse Report states that the wording of this principle “speaks of itself 
in terms which are clear enough”,24 I cannot agree. It is self-evident that any provider of 
insurance or social welfare, whether public or private sector, should strive to be 
  
23 ibid 40. There is room to argue over whether the primary focus on rehabilitation actually carried through 
to the Report’s specific recommendations.  
24 ibid 41. 
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administratively efficient and avoid wasteful spending.25 But, there is more to the 
Woodhouse principle of administrative efficiency than that. If the principle of community 
responsibility can be seen as a statement of profound moral insight, the principle of 
administrative efficiency is a statement of profound practical insight: a no-fault scheme is 
a more efficient allocation of resources.26 The Royal Commission’s investigation into the 
negligence action found that around forty per cent of the money in the negligence system 
comprised administrative and legal charges, even though there was no indication of 
overcharging.27 Simply put, the money in the negligence system could be put to better use 
by implementing a scheme where “the collection of funds and their distribution as benefits 
should be handled speedily, consistently, economically and without contention.”28 
B The Political “Left” and “Right” in New Zealand 
The purpose of this introductory section is to provide the reader with the political context 
that is the backdrop to the history of the ACC scheme in New Zealand. First, I clarify my 
usage of “left-wing” and “right-wing”. Second, I provide a brief political history of New 
Zealand for the purposes of the present discussion. 
  
25 For an example of how focusing on the words of “administrative efficiency” without appreciating the 
context can lead to a misunderstanding of the principle, see Roger Kerr, ‘ACC Monopoly an Idea Whose 
Time has Passed’ The Dominion Post (New Zealand, 2 November 2009) available at the New Zealand 
Initiative research archive at <https://nzinitiative.org.nz/insights/opinion/acc-monopoly-an-idea-whose-
time-has-passed/>: “Administrative efficiency? Any insurer can hold down administrative costs if they don’t 
properly investigate and monitor claims”. 
26 See Brian Easton, ‘The Historical Context of the Woodhouse Commission’ (2003) 34 VUWLR 207, 211 
and ‘The Idea of Access to Justice’ (n 2) 226. 
27 Woodhouse Report, 59. 
28 ibid 41. Emphasis added. 
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i. “Left-wing” and “right-wing” in New Zealand 
In this article, “left-wing” and “right-wing” are used in accordance with their present-day 
colloquial New Zealand meanings.29 Broadly speaking: 
• The left is typically associated with protecting the interests of workers and the less 
well-off, while the right is typically associated with promoting the interests of 
businesses and employers; 
• The left is associated with collectivist and government solutions to problems, while 
the right tends to support market-driven and privately-provided solutions; 
• The left tends to support progressive taxation and redistributive government 
spending, while the right does the opposite;  
• The left tends to emphasise the community’s responsibility to its members, while 
the right tends to emphasise the responsibility of individuals to look out for 
themselves. On the right, along with that responsibility to look after oneself 
economically goes a stronger conception of individual freedom from the 
government interfering in one’s economic affairs.  
This broad division arises in different countries,30 but what might be considered the 
“centre” between left and right varies. In New Zealand, the Labour Party is generally 
considered the main left-wing political party, and the National Party the main right-wing 
party.  
  
29 See Michael Littlewood, ‘The History of Death Duties and Gift Duty in New Zealand’ [2012] NZJTLP 66, 
67 for a similar approach to defining left and right in New Zealand in a different context. 
30 See John C Reitz, ‘Political Economy as a Major Architectural Principle of Public Law’ (2001) 75 Tul L 
Rev 1121, 1123-1124. 
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ii. A brief political history of New Zealand 
Until the mid-1980s, New Zealand had a long period of broad political consensus over 
social and economic policy. New Zealand’s first Labour government (1935-1949) 
established a welfare state and took a Keynesian approach to economics, with the state 
playing a highly active role in the economy. A stable two-party system emerged, with 
Labour on the left and National on the right.31 
The consensus on economic policy came to an end following the election of the 
fourth Labour government in 1984. The global recession in the mid-1970s, leading to high 
unemployment and inflation alongside low growth, had put pressure on the government 
coffers.32 The fourth Labour government’s response to this position was to abandon 
Keynesian economics in favour of a series of neoliberal economic reforms to transform 
New Zealand into a free-market economy. 
 The fourth National government (1990-1999) government continued to 
implement neoliberal economic policies.33 It also departed from the prior consensus on the 
welfare state, implementing dramatic reforms to the social welfare system, including 
reducing benefits and requiring beneficiaries to seek work.34  
Although the pace of neoliberal reform slowed from 1993, the fifth Labour 
government (1998-2008) “softened but further entrenched” the neoliberal policies of the 
fourth Labour and fourth National governments.35 The fifth Labour government’s approach 
  
31 Neill Atkinson, “New Zealand Politics 1935 to 1984” in Janine Hayward(ed), New Zealand Government 
and Politics (6th ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 2015) 15-24. 
32 Brian Roper, “New Zealand Politics Post-1984” in Janine Hayward(ed), New Zealand Government and 
Politics (6th ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne 2015) 28. 
33 Jack H Nagel, ‘Social Choice in a Pluralitarian Democracy: The Politics of Market Liberalization in New 
Zealand’ (1998) 28 British Journal of Political Science 223. 
34 See Maureen Baker, ‘Family welfare - Family policy, 1980–1999’ (Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New 
Zealand) <www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/family-welfare/page-6> accessed 19 February 2018. 
35 Roper (n 32) at 25 and 32-33. 
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has been characterised as a “third way” approach blending market solutions with a concern 
for social equality,36 and marks a retreat from the radical free-market approach of the fourth 
Labour government.  
The fifth Labour government’s policies included the Working for Families 
programme, which significantly increased the level of social welfare assistance for low-
income working families.37 The fifth Labour government was followed by the fifth 
National government (2008-2017), which responded to the global financial crisis by 
continuing the neoliberal programme, although Working for Families was retained.38 
 New Zealand’s present government is the sixth Labour government, elected in 
November 2017. One of the new government’s first moves was to expand the Working for 
Families programme.39 We are yet to see whether the sixth Labour government will be one 
that, on the whole, softens but maintains neoliberal policies, or marks a more dramatic 
departure from previous administrations. 
  
2. Community Insurance and Compulsory Insurance in the Abstract 
Despite these significant changes to social and economic policy, the core reform of the 
ACC scheme – dealing with accidents through a government-run scheme rather than civil 
proceedings – has endured. The scheme has been maintained by both Labour and National 
governments.40 However, the left and right support the same core reform for different 
  
36 See Gemma Piercy, Kate Mackness, Moana Rarere and Brendan Madley, “Investigating commentary on 
the fifth Labour-led government’s Third Way approach” (2017) 32(1) NZ Sociology 51. 
37 See Maureen Baker and Rosemary Du Plessis, 'Family welfare - Family welfare in the 21st century' (Te 
Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand) <http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/family-welfare/page-7> accessed 30 
August 2018. 
38 Roper (n 32) 25. 
39 See Baker and Du Plessis, (n 37). 
40 It is not the case where one party started supporting the scheme with the other opposing it, and at some 
point they switched sides – compare to the situation with tort in the United States of America described in 
14  
 
reasons, in alignment with their different political philosophies. Understanding this helps 
us explain why successive governments have made quite significant changes to the detail 
of the scheme while leaving the core reform intact. 
Broadly speaking, the core reform appeals to the left because the moral imperative 
of community responsibility is consistent with left-wing thinking, while the core reform 
can be justified to right-wing thinkers in terms of self-interest and economic efficiency. 
This can be understood in terms of two competing conceptions of the scheme, which I will 
call “community insurance” and “compulsory insurance”. Each offers a rationale for why 
the core reform is desirable. These two conceptions sit at opposite ends of a spectrum – we 
can think of the history of legislative changes in terms of a kind of tug-of-war where 
successive governments move the detail of the scheme up and down that spectrum. Neither 
pure community insurance nor pure compulsory insurance have been realised; the various 
statutory implementations of the scheme sit somewhere between the two. 
Of course, the actual state of New Zealand politics is more complex than a 
homogenous group of “left” politicians and an equally uniform group of “right” politicians 
that have consistently adhered to one conception of the scheme or the other. And, there is 
more to the various changes to the detail of the scheme than a movement on a simple 
spectrum. However, the point here is to do better than the idea that ACC was introduced as 
a result of, and persists because of, an ongoing bi-partisan embrace of community 
responsibility.  
  
Stephen D Sugarman, “Ideological Flip-Flop: American Liberals Are Now the Primary Supporters of Tort 




This section will elaborate on the “community insurance” and “compulsory insurance” 
conceptions of ACC, explain how they align with left- and right- wing thinking, and how 
they might be implemented in terms of the scope and funding of a scheme. When I discuss 
the efficiency of the scheme in this section, and in the following section where I set out the 
two conceptions as manifested in the legislative history of the scheme, I do so for the 
purposes of exposition of the two competing paradigms. That is, I am not myself making 
claims about the efficiency of the scheme as part of my argument about the two competing 
paradigms, but rather I am claiming that the “community insurance” and “compulsory 
insurance” mindsets involve empirical positions about the efficiency of the scheme. One 
can similarly observe that a particular political position entails views about the efficiency 
of free markets, for example, without necessarily adopting those views. 
A Community Insurance 
The community insurance conception of ACC stems from a wholehearted acceptance of 
the principle of community responsibility: what ACC is about is that the community has 
recognised that we ought to care for those members of our community who are injured. 
The “community” part of the label speaks for itself. The “insurance” part of the label 
captures the idea that ACC is a social insurance scheme, aimed at providing real 
compensation that reflects actual losses, as opposed to a social assistance scheme like the 
social welfare system.41 This community insurance conception of ACC is consistent with 
the tendency of the left to focus on protecting those in society who are worse off, and to do 
so through collectivist government solutions. 
  
41 Woodhouse Report, 107. 
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A community insurance approach would suggest an inclusive approach towards 
cover. As the Royal Commission looked beyond its original brief of ‘injuries to earners’ to 
all injuries, fully embracing community responsibility would arguably mean providing 
cover looking beyond injury to illness. As the Woodhouse Report put it:42 
It may be asked how incapacity arising from sickness and disease can be left 
aside. In logic there is no answer. A man overcome by ill health is no more able 
to work and no less afflicted than his neighbour hit by a car. 
That is an appeal to the first prong of the argument for community responsibility (as 
a result of benefitting from those who do work, the community should take responsibility 
for those who cannot). The second prong (that the community should take responsibility 
for injuries suffered during collective activities) could certainly be extended to illnesses 
that are contracted as a result of human contact.43 It could even be extended to genetically 
inherited conditions, especially if the ongoing propagation of the human species is itself 
considered a sort of collective activity.44 The degree to which one is persuaded by these 
arguments will depend on one’s tendency to take a collectivist as opposed to an 
individualist approach to things. 
With respect to funding, the Woodhouse Report’s statement of the principle of 
community responsibility simply states that the costs of the scheme should be borne on a 
  
42 Woodhouse Report, 17. The justification for excluding illness was pragmatic: the issue of injury was seen 
as a more urgent need. The Report suggested that “the proposals now put forward for injury leave the way 
entirely open for sickness to follow whenever the relevant decision is taken.” For further discussion see 
Jeffrey T Chapman, Review by Officials Committee of the Accident Compensation Scheme (Wellington 1986) 
and New Zealand Law Commission, Report on the Accident Compensation Scheme, Personal Injury: 
Prevention and Recovery (Wellington, NZLC R4, 1988). 
43 The case is perhaps even stronger for illness caused by human activities see Maria Hook, ‘New Zealand’s 
Accident Compensation Scheme and Man-Made Disease’ (2008) 39(2) VUWLR 289, 293-294 and 299-301. 
44 See Ken Oliphant, ‘Beyond Woodhouse: Devising New Principles for Determining ACC Boundary Issues’ 
(2004) 35 VUWLR 915, 926-935 for a discussion of ways of extending the scope of ACC without fully 
embracing community responsibility. 
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basis of equity by the community. This requires an account of how to equitably distribute 
the cost of the scheme across the community. The community insurance conception of 
ACC fills that void by considering the capacity of different parts of society to contribute to 
the finances of the scheme, as well as the extent to which different parts of society 
contribute to the risks of injury,45 in light of the overall picture of injuries arising out of the 
complex mix of collective activities performed by an industrialised modern society. The 
Woodhouse Report’s plan for funding the scheme reflected this approach in recommending 
a flat one per cent levy on all wages and salaries, to be paid by employers and the self-
employed rather than different levy rates for different industries or individual employers. 
To do so, the Report suggested, would be artificial and fail to recognise that: “[j]ust as the 
steam power station relies upon the work of the coal miner so do all industries depend 
directly upon one another.”46 
B Compulsory Insurance 
The compulsory insurance conception of ACC stems from rejecting the Woodhouse 
Report’s moral exhortations about community duty while accepting the finding that a no-
fault system is a better use of economic resources: the ACC scheme is best understood as 
a kind of compulsory insurance scheme. It is compulsory for individuals, who are insured 
against the risk of suffering injury, and for employers, who are insured against the risk of 
causing injury. Viewing ACC as a kind of compulsory insurance scheme is consistent with 
right wing political thinking, which tends to focus on economic efficiency, and individual 
responsibility rather than community responsibility. The “compulsory” part of the label 
  
45 For example, the Woodhouse Report states that drivers of motor vehicles should provide some additional 
contribution to the funding of the scheme. Woodhouse Report, 174. 
46 ibid 135. 
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reflects that the scheme is not optional. The idea of the scheme as “insurance” is much 
more closely aligned with private insurance arrangements than the community 
responsibility idea of social insurance. 
The core reform can be justified on economic grounds as a more economically 
efficient allocation of resources across society and also as economically preferable for 
individuals and employers. This is important for explaining the core reform’s appeal to the 
right because of its traditional emphasis on individualism and towards employer- and 
business- friendly policies. While the argument for community insurance can be seen as 
primarily an argument about moral duty, the argument for compulsory insurance is 
primarily an appeal to self-interest. With respect to the individual, the main argument is 
that one is better off having no-fault insurance for injury rather than leaving things up to 
the lottery of a fault-based system. In addition, one avoids the rare but potentially expensive 
possibility of liability for causing injury to someone else, and benefits from living in a 
society which, as a whole, functions more smoothly through the implementation of a no-
fault scheme. In addition, because the scheme is focused on rehabilitation and provides real 
compensation, workers return to work more quickly, and a system of paying levies is more 
predictable than the lottery of a fault-based system.47 The overall economic benefits to the 
nation can be said to outweigh the individual loss of autonomy that results from imposing 
a compulsory insurance that individual people or employers might not actually choose for 
themselves. The underlying principle basis for compulsory insurance can be put thus: the 
ACC scheme is good for the economy, and what is good for the economy is good for the 
community, so compulsion is justified. 
  
47 The latter benefit can also be achieved to some extent by allowing employers to insurance against liability 
in a fault-based system.  
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The compulsory insurance conception of ACC is not simply that everyone should 
get accident insurance.48 Rather, it is that everyone should get the specific form of accident 
insurance found in the ACC scheme which includes, to some extent, the implementation 
of the principles of real compensation and complete rehabilitation. Implementing those 
principles is necessary for the economic benefits of the scheme to actually accrue. For an 
individual, they are part of the package that makes giving up the negligence action 
acceptable. For an employer, a system without those features will not have the appeal of 
the ACC scheme – workers will not return to work as quickly, and real compensation is 
required for workers to be prepared to give up the right to sue. 
Although the compulsory insurance conception of ACC is closer to thinking of 
ACC as like a private insurance scheme than the community insurance conception, it is 
important to note that it does not entail a position on whether the scheme should be 
administered by private insurers, by a government entity, or by private insurers in 
competition with a government entity. How the scheme is administered should turn on what 
is more economically efficient, and different views exist on that question. 
Because it does not accept community responsibility, the compulsory insurance 
conception of ACC can explain why the ACC scheme does not extend to illness: it does 
not necessarily follow from the fact that it is more economically efficient for everyone to 
have ACC accident insurance that it is more economically efficient for everyone to have 
illness cover providing the same entitlements as the ACC scheme. As the authors of 
Accidents, Compensation and the Law observe, illness is a more common source of 
  
48 This distinguishes the “compulsory insurance” conception of ACC from systems that require, or strongly 
encourage, insurance with less generous benefits, for example the scheme implemented by The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (USA). See Barack Obama, ‘United States Health Care Reform / Progress 
to Date and Next Steps’ (2 August 2016) 316(5) JAMA 525 for a discussion of that scheme. 
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physical incapacity compared to accident,49 and a scheme that treated illness as ACC does 
injury would be vastly more expensive. Whether or not that expense can be justified by 
appealing to economics and self-interest is unclear. Furthermore, the idea of an accident is 
generally something that happens part way through one’s life, resulting in disability where 
there was none before.50 This is a good fit for thinking about the scheme as insurance: one 
pays for insurance before the risk materialises. The same general statement cannot be said 
about illness conditions, which can be present, and manifest as disability, from (and indeed 
before) birth.51 That said, it is possible that extending the ACC scheme to include illness 
would be economically efficient. From a compulsory insurance mindset, however, the 
numbers would be crunched to justify that conclusion. Instead, it may be that compulsory 
illness insurance would be more economically efficient than the status quo, but only if 
compensation is paid at a level lower than that available under the ACC scheme. That 
would suggest a different compulsory insurance scheme for illness, rather than bringing it 
into the ACC scheme. 
The compulsory insurance conception of ACC leads to a quite different model of 
funding compared to community insurance. Insurance involves the transfer of risk from 
one party to another.52 The cost of insurance typically reflects two aspects of risk: the 
chance of the risk occurring, and the value of an insured-against event occurring (i.e. the 
cost to the insurer of a claim). If ACC is a system of compulsory insurance, then the funding 
of the scheme should reflect that. The levies that individuals pay should reflect their risk 
  
49 Cane and Atiyah (n 8) 473. 
50 Although there are some cases where a person can have ACC cover from birth due to an injury to the 
mother, see Harrild v Director of Proceedings [2003] 3 NZLR 289 (CA). 
51 See Oliphant (n 44) 935.  
52 Risk is a different concept from fault. See Wall (n 6) 142-143. 
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of injury, and the entitlements that would be received if injury occurs. The levies that 
employers pay should reflect the risk that the particular employer has of causing injury. 
 One objection to the preceding claim that “compulsory insurance” paradigm of no-
fault accident compensation can be associated with right-wing thinking is this: that ACC 
is compulsory makes it a poor fit with right-wing thinking, at least in terms of how right-
wing thinking is normally understood in other jurisdictions. I have three responses to that 
objection. The first is to accept that the right, in New Zealand as in elsewhere, do tend to 
favour individual choice and oppose compulsion. However, the right also tend to favour 
measures that benefit the economy and protect employers. The ACC scheme can be seen 
as benefitting the economy and protecting employers, which arguably makes it worthwhile 
overall, despite interfering with individual freedom. 
The second response is that I also accept that a compulsory insurance scheme might be 
a difficult sell to the right elsewhere, but doing so does not undermine the central thesis of 
this paper that the notions of “community insurance” and “compulsory insurance” help 
explain the persistence and history of changes to the ACC scheme in New Zealand.  
The third response to the concern that the compulsory nature of ACC is a poor match 
for right-wing thinking is that path-dependency may have a role in the New Zealand right’s 
ongoing acceptance of ACC despite the scheme being compulsory. Originating from 
economics and the social sciences, path-dependency is the idea that “once a path is chosen, 
this choice itself affects possible future action to the point of locking in earlier paths even 
when this becomes comparatively inefficient.”53 In the ACC context, arguably the sheer 
  
53 Frédéric G. Sourgens “The Virtue of Path Dependence in the Law” 2016 Santa Clara Law Review at 306. 
See further Oona Hathaway, “Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System”, 86 Iowa LR 601 (2001). 
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enormity of the task of removing ACC and re-introduce an alternative, perhaps involving 
compensation based on fault, locks the right out of doing so, even though the scheme is an 
infringement on individual liberty. With the option of removing ACC off the table, the 
right have instead effectively sought to implement a right-wing version of ACC by 
changing the operation and funding of the scheme, as we will see in the following section. 
3. Community Insurance and Compulsory Insurance Manifested 
A Conflict Over Comprehensiveness in the Early Days of the Scheme 
The first accident compensation statute, the Accident Compensation Act 1972, was passed 
unanimously. However, a closer look at the events surrounding the introduction of the 
scheme shows that a difference of view over why a no-fault scheme is desirable is evident 
from an early stage.  
The Woodhouse Report was published when National was in power. The government’s 
response to the Report has a number of features which are consistent with the compulsory 
insurance conception of ACC. The government took a cautious approach to the Royal 
Commission’s recommendations, including commissioning officials to prepare a 
commentary on the Report. The officials’ commentary on the principle of community 
responsibility stated that the moral force of that principle depended on one’s political 
philosophy but that a scheme like the one recommended in the Woodhouse Report could 
be introduced on economic grounds.54 The scheme enacted in the original Accident 
Compensation Act 1972 was not the kind of comprehensive scheme that follows from 
  
54 Department of Labour, A Commentary on the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand (Wellington, 1969) 45. 
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taking community responsibility as a premise.55 Instead, the Act provided for two schemes, 
which replaced existing measures for certain types of injury: 
• An earners’ scheme for injuries to earners suffered in and outside of work, funded 
by risk-based levies on employers;56 and 
• A road accident scheme for motor vehicle injuries, funded by levies on motor 
vehicle owners. 
The risk-based employer levy is  more consistent with a compulsory insurance approach, 
compared to the Woodhouse Report’s recommendation of a flat levy. 
The original 1972 Act was passed unanimously. The then Labour opposition’s 
support of the Act should be understood as being because they considered the Act an 
improvement of the status quo. The Labour party had been much more supportive of the 
Woodhouse Report than National,57 so it should not have been particularly surprising when, 
after winning power in 1972, the third Labour government amended the 1972 Act to make 
the scheme comprehensive. This was achieved by adding a “supplementary” scheme to 
cover all injuries not addressed by the other two schemes, funded by general taxation. Two 
aspects of the supplementary scheme reflect a community insurance approach. First, the 
extension of the scheme to non-earners, despite the cost, can be understood in terms of 
accepting the moral imperative of community responsibility. Second, funding the 
supplementary scheme through general taxation spreads the cost of accidents to non-
earners widely across the community. 
  
55 One major concern was cost, see George F Gair, ‘Report of Select Committee on Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand’ I AJHR [1970] I15, 21-22. See Cane and Atiyah (n 8) 446.  
56 Including the self-employed. 
57 See Palmer (n 7) 21. 
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The scheme almost took a turn even further towards comprehensiveness in the early 
1990s. A series of reports produced in the late 1980s highlighted the issue of the exclusion 
of illness: a review of the scheme by officials from various government departments,58 the 
Royal Commission on Social Policy,59 and a Law Commission Report on the scheme.60 
The government of the day, the fourth Labour government, looked into extending the ACC 
scheme to illness while reducing its cost by lowering the compensation available. 
Two of the objections that arose to that extension are noteworthy for present purposes. 
The Social Welfare department and its Minister noted that extending ACC to illness would 
create a disparity between people incapacitated through illness and injury (who received 
more) and beneficiaries not working for other reasons (such as unemployment, age, or 
parenting responsibilities).61 If the distinction between illness and injury is unjustified, why 
maintain an equally unjustifiable two classes of beneficiary?  
A different view on extending the scheme to illness was put forward by trade unions, 
which objected to the reduction of entitlements considered necessary for the extension of 
the scheme. Palmer explains this as the trade unions being “determined to protect their 
members’ interests, and the unions do not include non-earners.”62 We could also see it in 
terms of trying to hold the state to the ACC social contract: having given up the right to 
sue, workers deserve a system that provides compensation close to that available under tort 
– reducing entitlements under ACC to include illness while continuing to bar the right to 
  
58 Chapman (n 42). 
59 Royal Commission on Social Policy, Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy (Wellington, 1988).  
60 New Zealand Law Commission (n 42). The government essentially invited the recommendation of the 
extension of the scheme to illness by asking the Law Commission (then chaired by Sir Owen Woodhouse) to 
comment on whether the current scheme was operating in accordance with the principles laid down in the 
Woodhouse Report, see terms of reference at viii. 
61 See Palmer (n 7) 235. 
62 ibid 235. 
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sue is a breach of the social contract because it takes away without giving back. Despite 
these objections, the Labour government introduced a Bill to implement the proposed 
extension of ACC.63 However, the National party won power before the Bill was passed 
and did not take it further. 
B Conflict Over Funding: Fully-Funded Versus Pay-As-You-Go 
One of the ongoing debates about the scheme, which links to the community 
insurance/compulsory insurance debate, is whether the funding model should be pay-as-
you-go or fully-funded. 
Pay-as-you-go funding is relatively straight-forward: each year, the scheme collects 
enough money to pay for the scheme’s expected outgoings that year. Collecting a modest 
reserve is not incompatible with pay-as-you-go funding but is not a necessary part of it. 
Pay-as-you-go is generally the funding model used for social welfare or health systems.  
Under the fully-funded model, each year, the scheme must collect enough money 
to pay for the lifetime cost of injuries suffered in that year. That is, all the money that is 
expected to ever be spent on injuries suffered in that year, estimated using actuarial 
calculations, is collected and set aside. The full-funding model is closer to that of private 
insurance schemes.64 
Each funding model spreads the cost of accidents across different groups of levy 
payers. To illustrate this, suppose Jane breaks her shoulder at work, which needs treatment. 
Five years later, she needs surgery. She has cover for her fracture and is entitled to have 
the contemporaneous treatment and the later surgery provided as entitlements under the 
  
63 Rehabilitation and Incapacity Bill 1990. 
64 Michael Littlewood (Michael Littlewood, ‘Why does the Accident Compensation Corporation have a 
fund?’ in Pension Commentary (University of Auckland Business School 2009) 3). 
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ACC scheme. Under fully-funded, the funding for both the immediate treatment and the 
subsequent surgery will be paid for with money collected in the year she was injured, from 
employers paying levies in that year, which includes Jane’s employer. Under pay-as-you-
go, the funding for her immediate treatment also comes from the money collected that year, 
which comes from employers paying levies in that year. However, the later surgery is 
funded by employers who happened to be paying levies five years later, which (for 
argument’s sake) does not include Jane’s employer, which has since gone out of business. 
That outcome is objectionable from a compulsory insurance point of view: it is 
unfair that the employers who happen to be operating five years after Jane’s injury must 
bear the cost of her surgery. They did not contribute to the risk of Jane’s injury and did not 
directly benefit from her historical employment. Pay-as-you-go could also be said to be 
unfair from an intergenerational equity point of view, on the basis that it is unfair to leave 
ongoing or subsequent injury costs to later levy-payers.65 Pay-as-you-go could also be seen 
to be imprudent in light of an ageing population, where the proportion of earners in the 
population, who are funding the scheme, will be lower while at the same time ongoing 
entitlement costs are rising because people are living longer. 
If we instead take a community insurance point of view, the objections to the 
fairness of pay-as-you-go melt away: it is fair for the community to absorb the costs of 
people who were injured in the past, because that is precisely what the community ought 
to be doing.66 Furthermore, it can be argued that there is no need for a government-run 
scheme to set aside a substantial reserve for future expenditure because governments “can 
  
65 See Accident Compensation Corporation Statement of Intent 2015-2019 (Accident Compensation 
Corporation, 2015) at 19. 
66 See Clayton (n 10) 461: “Pure pay-as-you go funding is philosophically more appropriate for a 
comprehensive, state fund scheme as the ACC”. 
27  
 
always fund their social commitments from higher levies or taxes.”67 It is also arguable that 
full-funding is not only not necessary but not possible “given the very long-term and 
unpredictable nature of some of the compensation and other benefits involved.”68 
The ACC scheme started out fully-funded, but was shifted to pay-as-you-go by the 
third National government in the 1982 Act. The reason for this shift was for an immediate 
political payoff: it decreased levies (although that effect was short-lived).69 The fourth 
National government initially rejected a return to fully-funding because it would be 
prohibitively expensive,70 but later brought it back in the late 1990s, as a necessary step for 
privatising the scheme. 
  The scheme has remained full-funded ever since. The fifth Labour government, in 
power for nine years, did not return the scheme to pay-as-you-go, despite making other 
changes to the scheme including reversing privatisation. As Susan St John has remarked,71 
this is somewhat surprising, given Labour’s general community insurance approach. St 
John offers several possible explanations, including a desire to prevent a repeat of the 1980s 
experience of pay-as-you-go and that the “fiscal conservatism” of that Labour government 
  
67 Susan St John, ‘ACC the Lessons from History’ (2010) 6(1) Policy Quarterly 23, 24, see further Littlewood 
(n 64), 18. 
68 Susan St John ‘Accident Compensation in New Zealand A Fairer Scheme?’ in Jonathan Boston, Paul 
Dalziel and Susan St John Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand: Problems, Policies and Prospects, 
(OUP 1999), 158. See also Clayton (n 10) 460 for the argument that actuarial calculation is “eductively 
alluring in theory, it is largely chimerical in practice … almost as pointless as the debate in mediaeval 
scholasticism as to the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin”. 
69 See Don Rennie, ‘Administering Accident Compensation in the 1980s’ (2003) 19 VUWLR 329, 348. 
70 Hon William F Birch, Accident Compensation: A Fairer Scheme (Wellington, 1991) 28. Shifting from pay-
as-you-go to fully-funded means that, as well as collecting levies for the future cost of accidents suffered in 
a particular year, the scheme would also need to build up a fund for the future cost of injuries suffered during 
the pay-as-you go period. This was done when full-funding was brought back in in 1998, and it took until 
2015 to build up the funds for the future costs of the pay-as-you-go period. See Accident Compensation 
Corporation The residual portion of your levy will be removed <www.residuallevy.acc.co.nz> accessed 19 
February 2018. 
71 St John (n 67) 27. 
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led them to consider that full-funding could be justified on its own merits rather than as a 
means to the end of privatisation.72 
In 2012, it seemed that the previous bi-partisan consensus about full-funding could 
be coming to an end. Andrew Little, then Labour ACC spokesman, stated in a speech that 
the argument for full-funding:73 
[S]ays that tomorrow's community is somehow disconnected from, or unrelated 
to, the community today [and is] totally contradictory to the notion of 
community responsibility articulated in the original Woodhouse Report. 
Little stated that the Labour government should review the funding of the scheme, as 
well as the exclusion of illness – moves which would be consistent with a shift to 
community insurance. In a radio interview in 2015, Little, who at the time was Labour 
party leader, again indicated that Labour would investigate returning to pay-as-you-go 
funding.74  
In 2014, Labour places all its policies under review. In 2017, when the Labour Party’s 
Manifesto was released in the lead up to the election, the ACC Policy mentioned improving 
the levy system, including removing the risk rating model for vehicles. However, no 
mention is made of a return to pay-as-you-go or an expansion of cover to include illness.75 
The policy of the New Zealand Green Party, which is supporting the current Labour-led 
government is to return ACC to pay-as-you-go funding.76 
  
72 St John (n 71) 28. 
73 Vernon Small, ‘Little: Change ACC illness “injustice”’ Stuff (New Zealand, 5 November 2012) 
<www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/7907461/Little-Change-ACC-illness-injustice> accessed 19 February 
2018. 
74 See Morning Report, ‘Labour leader says fully funded ACC is not needed’ (Radio New Zealand, 12 May 
2015) <www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/morningreport/audio/201753959/labour-leader-says-fully-
funded-acc-is-not-needed> accessed 19 February 2018. 
75 New Zealand Labour Party Manifesto 2017: Accident Compensation (New Zealand Labour Party, 2017). 
76 New Zealand Green Party Accident Compensation Policy <https://www.greens.org.nz/page/accident-
compensation-policy> accessed 19 February 2018. 
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C The Insurance Era of ACC 
Following their election in 1990, the National government shelved the various reports 
recommending extending the scheme to illness. A new series of reports were prepared, 
which advocated for a move towards a compulsory insurance version of ACC.77 These 
reports supported the core reform on the basis that no-fault was a more economically 
efficient form of compensation than tort,78 but raised concerns about the present state of 
the scheme. It was suggested that scheme had eroded personal responsibility,79 was 
inequitably funded,80 and that judicial decisions had expanded the scope of the scheme 
beyond what Parliament originally intended, leading to cost increases.81 This led to the 
Accident Rehabilitation, Compensation and Insurance Act 1992. As a number of 
commentators have observed, the 1992 Act brought the scheme much closer to a private 
insurance scheme.82 The 1992 Act introduced a whole series of changes to the scheme that 
are consistent with a shift towards a compulsory insurance version of ACC, starting with 
the presence of the word “Insurance” in the statute itself. 
 The scheme was separated into different “accounts”, each of which had a different 
revenue stream:  
Account Funds entitlements for Funded by 
Work Account Work accidents Levies on employers 
  
77 Ministerial Working Party on the Accident Compensation Corporation and Incapacity, Report (1991) 51 
and First Supplementary Report (1991), Birch (n 70). 
78 See Ministerial Working Party on the Accident Compensation Corporation and Incapacity, Report (1991) 
51, [14] and Birch (n 70) 16. 
79 See Ministerial Working Party on the Accident Compensation Corporation and Incapacity, Report (1991) 
51, [16]. 
80 Birch (n 70) 10-15. 
81 Birch (n 70) 8. 
82 See, for example: S. St John (n 68) 162-163, Mahoney (n 8) 210 and Richard Miller, ‘An Analysis and 
Critique of the 1992 Changes to New Zealand’s Accident Compensation Scheme’ (1992) 5(1) Canterbury 
Law Rev 1, 1-2. 
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Motor Vehicle Injury Motor Vehicle accidents Vehicle registrations and 
petrol levies 
Earners’ Account Earners who are injured in 
other accidents (i.e. non-
work non-motor vehicle 
accidents) 
A levy on earnings 
Non-Earners’ Account Non-earners who are 




Prior to the 1992 Act, levies on employers funded both work and non-work 
accidents for employers. After the 1992 Act, employers were only required to fund the 
work account, so employees essentially had to take on the responsibility for insuring 
themselves for accidents outside work. This was achieved by placing a levy on earnings, 
which was collected by the Inland Revenue Department. For the funding of the Work 
Account, the 1992 Act retained levies for employers based on risk at industry level, and re-
introduced “experience rating” adjustments for the accident record of individual 
employers.83 This is all consistent with a compulsory insurance vision for ACC: employers 
  
83 Section 73 of the original 1972 Act provided a form of experience rating in that levies could be increased 
by up to 100% or decreased by up to 50% for employers whose accident record was “significantly” worse or 
better the norm for their class. The strict “significantly” requirement proved unworkable and s 73 was later 
amended to give ACC a broad discretion to adjust levies based on employers’ “accident experience”, see 
Susan St John (1981) “Safety Incentives in the New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme” New Zealand 
Economic Papers Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 1981 111, 115. St John’s paper also provides a critique at 123-125 of this 
use of employer accident records. ACC did make some cautious and exploratory use of the revised power in 
the early 1980s, but the practice was abandoned a few years later with no reason given, see Lamm, McDonnell 
and St John (n 13) 28 and Ian Campbell “Compensation for personal injury in New Zealand its rise and fall” 
(Auckland University Press 1996) at 205-208.  
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pay levies based on their contribution to risk, and higher earners pay more into the Earners’ 
Account because they stand to receive greater weekly compensation if injured. The funding 
of the Motor Vehicle Account also reflects risk since the petrol levy component means 
people who drive more frequently contribute more. The Non-Earners’ Account is the least 
like compulsory insurance, since it is funded through general taxation. The overall picture 
of the 1992 Act has been described as “an overarching anti-collectivist theme … an exodus 
from the principle of community or collective responsibility”.84 
 The 1992 Act also marked a shift in legislative drafting philosophy.85 In contrast to 
the 1972 Act, the 1992 Act took a prescriptive approach to cover and entitlements. For 
example, while the 1972 Act provided cover for “personal injury by accident” but gave no 
exhaustive definition, the 1992 Act provided cover for “personal injury caused by an 
accident” and gave exhaustive definitions for both “personal injury” and “accident”.86 The 
definition of “accident” is broken down into a series of different types of accident, for 
example “The inhalation or oral ingestion of any solid, liquid, gas, or foreign object where 
the inhalation or ingestion occurs on a specific occasion”.87 Where the 1972 Act took a 
relatively discretionary approach to the determination of entitlements, for example weekly 
compensation, the 1992 Act took a prescriptive approach, setting out formulae for 
calculation. Thus, the 1992 Act resembles an insurance policy far more than its 
predecessors. 
The apex of the insurance era of ACC was the Accident Insurance Act 1998, passed by 
the then National government. The 1998 Act introduced competitive provision of the Work 
  
84 See Miller  (n 82) 14-15. 
85 ‘The Idea of Access to Justice’ (n 2) 202. 
86 1992 Act, s 8, 3 and 4 (2001 Act s 20, 25 and 26). 
87 1992 Act, s 3, definition of accident (b). 
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Account. That is, private insurers were able to collect levies and provide entitlements. The 
theory was that private insurers would be able to operate more efficiently than a 
government provider, even though they were still required to provide the same package of 
statutory entitlements. To facilitate private provision of ACC, the scheme was returned to 
full-funding. The language of the statute took things even further down the insurance path. 
As well as stripping any mention of rehabilitation or compensation from the name of the 
statute, references to “persons” or “claimants” in the 1992 Act were changed to “insureds” 
in the 1998 Act.  
D The End of the Insurance Era and Beyond 
Competitive provision of ACC did not last long. It commenced in July 1999, but Labour 
returned to power in 1999 and quickly moved to re-nationalise accident compensation.88 
After removing competitive provision, Labour made further changes to the scheme by 
passing the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001. The 2001 Act 
ditched the “insurance” language of the insurance era statutes. It did, however, retain a 
number of features of the Insurance Era version of the ACC scheme. The 2001 Act retained 
the prescriptive style of drafting, and did not return the comprehensiveness of the scheme 
to its pre-1992 Act state (although some incremental expansions of cover have later been 
made).89 Furthermore, the 2001 Act retained full-funding, although experience rating for 
individual employers was removed as part of the Work Account funding model. 
The fifth National government came into power in 2008, and made no seismic 
changes to the ACC scheme. That said, several minor changes have been made to the 
  
88 Accident Insurance Amendment Act 2000 and Accident Insurance (Transitional Provisions) Act 2000. 
89 “Treatment Injury” cover (Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Amendment Act 2005), 
“work-related mental injury”, (Injury, Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Amendment Act 2008). 
33  
 
funding side of the scheme which are consistent with a compulsory insurance conception 
of the scheme. National reintroduced experience rating for individual employers, which 
seems to have been something of a political game of ping-pong: experience rating was not 
part of the funding of the original scheme, was introduced by National in 1992, removed 
by Labour in 2001 and re-introduced by National in 2011. In 2015, National introduced 
changes to vehicle registrations so that owners of safer vehicles90 do not have to contribute 
as much to the Motor Vehicle Account. This makes sense from a compulsory insurance 
viewpoint: people with safer vehicles are at less risk of serious injury, and should not have 
to pay as much. However, the change does not make sense from a community insurance 
viewpoint. Indeed, people who own safer vehicles tend to be better off than those with 
older and less safe ones, and perhaps should be shouldering more of the burden of the cost 
of the scheme, rather than less. 
One final issue that has arisen in the post-insurance era of ACC which helpfully 
draws out the community insurance/compulsory insurance distinction is that of weekly 
compensation for potential earners. Consider the following scenario: 
Joe is in his final year at University. He has not worked in his time as a student. Joe 
breaks his shoulder in an accident playing casual cricket. After graduating, Joe lands a 
high-paying job. Two years into his new job, he experiences further problems with his 
shoulder. This requires time off work, then surgery, then more time off work recovering. 
Can Joe receive compensation because he has missed work? The answer is yes. Can 
Joe receive weekly compensation based on his actual lost earnings from his well-paid 
position? The answer is, perhaps unintuitively, no. Rather, Joe receives weekly 
  
90 At least, vehicles that are deemed to be safer based on make and model. 
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compensation at the minimal “potential earner” rate because, at the time of the injury, he 
was a potential earner and not an earner.91 On this point, the statute is crystal clear, perhaps 
ruthlessly so.92 Joe might be worse off if, rather than studying, he had been injured while 
taking a non-working year off travelling. If he was classified as a non-earner at date of 
injury, then he would not be eligible for lost earnings compensation at all. 
That outcome might seem unfair,93 particularly from a community insurance point of 
view. However, it is explicable by understanding the scheme as a fully-funded compulsory 
insurance scheme. At the time Joe was injured, he was not an earner and was not 
contributing to the Earners’ Account. Therefore, he is not eligible to later receive earnings-
based entitlements funded through the Earners’ Account. He would have been contributing 
to the Non-Earners’ Account, which is funded through general taxation (which includes 
tax collected through Goods and Services Tax), but not to the extent that he could be said 
to have purchased insurance for his future earnings. His injury can be seen as a kind of pre-
existing condition, so when he gets his job and starts paying earner levies into the Earners’ 
Account, he is only purchasing insurance for any injuries that he suffers after that date. 
After this potential earner issue was decided by the Courts, it received some political 
attention. Iain Lees-Galloway, then Labour spokesperson for ACC, issued a press release 
stating that Labour would do away with this “unfair anomaly”.94 Then National Party ACC 
  
91 80% of the higher of: the minimum wage or 125% of the invalid’s benefit, see 2001 Act, Schedule 1, cl 
42(3) and 47(4). 
92 Murray & Others v ACC [2013] NZHC 2967 at [65] and [69]. See also ACC v Vandy [2011] 2 NZLR 131 
(HC) and Giltrap v ACC DC Wellington 141/206, 9 June 2006. 
93 See Giltrap at [22] and Murray at [69]. 
94 Iain Lees-Galloway, ‘Labour promises a fairer ACC for all Kiwis’ (Press Release, New Zealand Labour 
Party, 8 August 2014). 
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spokesperson, Judith Collins, responded that Labour treated employers as a “bottomless 
money box”.95 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that the persistence of New Zealand’s accident compensation scheme cannot 
simply be attributed to the idea that New Zealand is, and always has been, an egalitarian 
paradise where the community looks after everyone. That the accident compensation 
scheme is still here, despite significant neo-liberal reforms to other areas of the law, 
requires understanding why the scheme appeals to the political right as well as the left. I 
have attempted to put forward such an explanation in this article: while the left embrace 
the Woodhouse principle of community responsibility and think of the ACC scheme as 
“community insurance”, the right are more interested in the economic efficiency arguments 
of the Woodhouse Report and think of the scheme as “compulsory insurance”.  
I have shown that the community insurance/compulsory insurance conflict can be seen 
to underly a number of features of the statutory history of the scheme, with successive 
governments generally moving the details of the scheme backwards and forwards between 
the two. The existence of these two competing paradigms also explains why the scheme 
has not inevitably grown to encompass illness. The usual argument for including illness 
takes the principle of community responsibility as a premise, and that premise has not been 
accepted by the political right in New Zealand. To conclude, I will offer a few comments 
for comparable jurisdictions considering something like ACC. 
  
95 Judith Collins, ‘Labour’s ACC policy treats employers as bottomless money box’ (Press Release, New 
Zealand Government, 8 August 2014). 
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A Comments for Other Jurisdictions Considering No-Fault Schemes 
The main piece of advice I have for other jurisdictions considering no-fault is that, if they 
are like New Zealand and subject to a political cycle where governments tend to alternate 
between left- and right-wing, the longevity of a no-fault scheme will probably depend on 
the extent to which it is palatable to both wings of politics. This does not mean that the 
success of a no-fault scheme is dependent on unanimous passing of the first statutory 
version of the scheme. Rather, the aim is that, when power passes, the new government 
tinkers with the detail of the scheme rather than repeals it entirely. 
It must also be said that the introduction of the ACC scheme has had its downsides. 
I agree with Wall that the loss of the tort system as a means of holding individuals to 
account for loss-causing departures from objective standards of behaviour is a meaningful 
one. Before ACC, tort law played a role in regulating workplace health and safety standards 
via the torts of negligence and breach of statutory duty. That function was lost through the 
introduction of the ACC scheme. Although the Woodhouse Report was sceptical about the 
deterrent effect of the tort system, one might well reasonably wonder whether the loss of 
proceedings for compensatory damages has had a role in New Zealand’s poor workplace 
health and safety record.96 That said, that does not necessarily mean that concerns about 
deterrence are a sufficient reason to reject a no-fault scheme. Rather, other mechanisms 
must be established to deter unsafe workplaces or products, and should be done 
concurrently with the introduction of a no-fault scheme and the removal of fault-based 
proceedings. In 2015, New Zealand implemented stricter workplace health and safety 
  
96 See WorkSafe New Zealand Towards 2020 progress towards the 2020 work-related injury reduction 
(Wellington: November 2017) 4. 
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laws,97 and there are signs of improvement in fatal and serious work-related injuries.98 In 
addition, O’Sullivan and Tokeley have recently raised valid questions as to whether the 
ACC scheme has left a gap in New Zealand’s legal system with respect to the responsibility 
of manufacturers towards consumers with respect to injuries caused by product failures.99 
A further thought is that, although ACC is, broadly speaking, compatible with right- 
and left- wing thinking, there might be other societal differences between New Zealand 
and elsewhere that might prove substantial obstacles the introduction of a no-fault scheme. 
Gaskins and Oliphant have argued that social and political factors blocked the emergence 
of no-fault schemes elsewhere in the 1960s.100 
 In terms of comparing New Zealand with the United States of America, 
Fischer, argues that no-fault is a better fit with the former’s concern for fairness compared 
to the latter’s regard for individual freedom.101 Robert A. Kagan helpfully distinguishes 
“adversarial legalism”, a claimant-driven system of adjudication where the introduction of 
evidence and the invocation of legal rules is led by the parties’ lawyers rather than judges, 
which he argues is the dominant approach in the United States of America, with other forms 
of legalism such as “bureaucratic legalism”, characterised by centrally devised rules and a 
significant role for officials including responsibility for fact-finding.102 The ACC scheme 
  
97 Health and Safety at Work Act 2015; see Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy Royal 
Commission Report (Wellington: October 2012). 
98 Towards 2020 (n 106) at 6-7. 
99 Trish O’Sullivan and Kate Tokeley “Consumer Product Failure Causing Personal Injury Under the No-
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Policy, published online 10 August 2018. 
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101 Fischer (n 9). Compare Wendel (n 9). 
102 Robert A. Kagan Adversarial Legalism (Harvard UP, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2001) 10-11.  
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is arguably an example of the latter and, moreover, New Zealand society in general does 
not exhibit a particular fondness for adversarial legalism. Indeed, even among pre-ACC 
legal practitioners there was no clear support for the negligence action – the New Zealand 
Law Society’s submission to the Royal Commission noted a range of views and stated that 
the Society was unable to express a view representative of the profession as a whole.103 For 
a society that embraces adversarial legalism, however, the introduction of a no-fault 
scheme may see more opposition. 
The final comment I have for other jurisdictions is that implementation of a no-fault 
scheme does not necessarily whet public appetite for fault-based compensation in some 
circumstances. In New Zealand, persons convicted of criminal offences can be ordered as 
part of the sentencing process to pay compensatory awards of “reparation” to victims and 
their families injured by the offending.104 A majority of the Supreme Court considered that 
the sentencing statute did not allow for reparation awards to “top-up” payments made under 
the ACC Scheme, for example an offender paying the 20% of lost earnings not paid by the 
scheme, with Tipping J stating that such a practice would “go against the whole philosophy 
and purpose of the accident compensation scheme”.105 However, Parliament had the last 
word, passing legislation to overturn the Supreme Court and reinstate the practice of 
“topping-up” of ACC payments by reparation.106 
  
103 Palmer Compensation for Incapacity (n 7) 89. 
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